Opinion Says Defendant Facing Felony Charges for Allegedly Kidnapping Fiancée From Facility Where She Was Held Under Temporary Guardianship Was Wrongly Blocked From Calling Her to Testify
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge in a criminal proceeding erred in quashing a defense subpoena relating to the victim of an alleged kidnapping, who was purportedly taken by her fiancé from a conservator’s facility after being diagnosed with schizophrenia, based on a finding that a probate court order declaring her to be “gravely disabled” was dispositive of her incompetence to testify.
Competency to testify is governed by Evidence Code §701, which provides that “[a] person is disqualified to be a witness” if she is “[i]ncapable of expressing…herself” or “of understanding the duty…to tell the truth.”
Justice Richard T. Fields authored Thursday’s opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Manuel A. Ramirez and Justice Carol D. Codrington, noting that the “issue of whether incompetence to testify can be presumed from a grave disability finding…appears to be one of first impression.”
Pointing out that the standard applicable for finding a party to be “gravely disabled” and in need of involuntary civil commitment under the Lanterman–Petris–Short Act (the “LPS Act”), codified at Welfare & Institutions Code §5000 et seq., requires a different showing than §701, Fields opined:
“Whether a witness’s mental health disorder renders them incapable of expressing themself or understanding the duty to tell the truth must be determined by the trial court…, the answer to those questions cannot be presumed from a prior finding regarding their mental health. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred when it ruled that [the alleged victim’s] competence to testify was ‘already . . . determined’ by the fact that a probate court had found her to be gravely disabled….”
Kidnapping Charges
Challenging the order quashing the subpoena was Alexander Esparza, who was charged in October 2024 with kidnapping his fiancée, identified in the opinion only as “L.S.,” from a Redlands-area facility run by the San Bernardino County Office of the Public Guardian. At the time she went missing from the location, L.S. was under a temporary conservatorship pursuant to the LPS Act.
After the couple was apprehended attempting to return to the U.S. from Mexico, a probate court found that L.S. was “gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder and is unable to provide for basic personal needs of food, clothing, and/or shelter.” On Oct. 11, 2024, the San Bernardino County Office of the Public Guardian was appointed as her conservator following a schizophrenia diagnosis.
In January 2025, Esparza served the conservator with a subpoena seeking L.S.’s appearance and testimony at his upcoming preliminary hearing. The office responded by filing a motion to quash, arguing that L.S.’s status as “gravely disabled” rendered her incompetent to testify as a matter of law.
San Bernardino Superior Court Judge R. Glenn Yabuno granted the motion, saying:
“[I]t is the Court’s belief that the…issue has already been determined. There has already been a finding that [L.S.] does not have the capacity to testify….I don’t believe it is a situation that has to be relitigated under 701.”
Esparza filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking vacatur of the trial court’s order.
Other Types of Incompetence
Saying that “it is well established that other types of incompetence—to stand trial, to waive certain trial rights, to give or withhold consent to medical treatment—may not be presumed from a grave-disability finding,” Fields reasoned:
“Although those decisions do not involve the determination of competence to testify under Evidence Code section 701, we think that their holdings apply in this context with equal force….[L]ike the standards for those other types of competence, the standard for competence to testify is distinct from the standard for determining grave disability under the LPS Act….Because the two standards are different, one cannot serve as a substitute for the other.”
Citing case law that predates the 1967 enactment of the LPS Act, he commented:
“On multiple occasions, our Supreme Court has held that a mental disorder or cognitive deficiency is not, on its own, sufficient to demonstrate that a witness is incompetent to testify.”
The San Bernardino County Office of the Public Guardian asserted that any testimony L.S. might have provided at the preliminary hearing would have been irrelevant to the defendant’s kidnapping charges because, as her conservator at the time of the alleged offense, it was the only party with the authority to consent to her leaving the facility.
Material Evidence
Rejecting the characterization, Fields acknowledged that a subpoena may be properly quashed where the witness would not have contributed any material evidence but said:
“Because L.S. is the alleged victim of the charged crime, her testimony will undoubtedly contribute material evidence. If, on remand, the trial court determines that L.S. is competent to testify in the proceeding, she would be a percipient witness to the alleged crime. On a scale of materiality, it is difficult to imagine a more material witness.”
In a footnote, the jurist noted that “the trial court incorrectly referred to witness ‘capacity’ as opposed to ‘competency,’ ” but he found that the issue was properly identified as being governed by §701.
He declared:
“Let a writ of mandate issue, directing the superior court to vacate its order granting the Public Guardian’s motion to quash, to enter an order denying the motion, and to determine L.S.’s competence under the standard set out in Evidence Code section 701.”
The case is Esparza v. Superior Court (People), 2026 S.O.S. 378.
Source:
Court of Appeal:
Judge Erred in Quashing Subpoena for ‘Disabled’ Victim
